Archive for the ‘Voting Rights’ Category

Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, by Commissioner Jackson

February 17, 2018 1 comment

Recently elected commissioner of US SEC Robert J. Jackson Jr. recently shared certain personal remarks regarding the system of perpetual dual-class shares, (1) and (2).

I will simply refer to them in a very short post today, as the argument is very clear.

He first considers the constitutional principles in the US, which led to complete democracy, and rejects the idea that perpetual systems can be used by an elite to keep power and wealth or privileges forever (even after death so that their heirs inherit that package). Read more…


The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, by Dorothy Shapiro Lund

The increase in the power of shareholders faces big challenges as regulation is not necessarily followed by a correct valuation of voting (the most powerful of their capacities), by them. The One Share One Vote principle is affected by dual-class share systems and no voting shares; but shareholders also suffer from rational apathy and collective action problems, so that the objective of empowering shareholders is not easily reached. See my previous posts on the topic here (1)

Dorothy Shapiro Lund from the University of Chicago recently published an article in which she analyzes the effect on rational voting practices stemming from the shift of investors (American in her study) from actively managed funds investing into (indexed) passive funds. (2) She states this trend will damage the market for corporate influence, thus lowering the discipline imposed on managers. Their investment in Corporate Governance (CG from now on) and/or in gathering firm-specific information leaves them with the cost and only a small fraction of the eventual profit…so they lack the financial incentive to invest. Furthermore, passive funds are less likely to channel funds to hedge funds, (which could help correct the problem, -see (3)), and will adhere to low-cost governance solutions, following proxy advisors or simple-not-so-smart criteria).

150331130735-motley-index-funds-780x439 Read more…

Agency Costs and Institutional dominated share ownership: activists and governance

July 9, 2017 1 comment

Summary: Institutional Investors (II) -such as mutual funds- are rational while not doing research and issuing shareholder proposals; activists and hedge funds may have a role issuing those proposals, so that others have an option to increase their voting value. (See (1) and (2) by Gilson, Ronald J. and Gordon, Jeffrey N. and by Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Cohen, Alma and Hirst, Scott respectively.

The fact that property is concentrated in II makes the world of Berle and Means outdated. A new agency problem arises between record owners, (II now) and managers, but also between record owners and beneficial owners, (this is what they call “Agency Capitalism”, where II or agents hold investments on behalf of final or beneficial owners).

Read more…

Blockholders and Private Benefits

The idea that economic and political rights are granted in proportion to investments made by diffused shareholders constitutes a “central premise in modern financial theory”. Nevertheless, even in the Anglo-saxon countries, the fact that a single shareholder owns a relevant stake, (more than 10%, 15% or even 50%) is very common, so that there is a possibility that some private benefits could be extracted by them. Do these private benefits exist? Would stock prices reflect these benefits if they existed? Read more…

Should we favor long-term shareholders? How?

January 2, 2014 1 comment

The Generation Foundation teamed with Mercer and Stikeman Elliot LLP in 2013, in order to do research on what investors and issuers thought about the possibility that loyalty-driven securities could be used as a tool to favor long-term shareholders, with the final aim that society as a whole could avoid the negative effects of short-termism that we would here take as granted. (1)

This was one in five elements previously identified in their article “Sustainable Capitalism”.(2) The new study finds out that the idea is mostly understood but rejected, in favor of some other alternatives to reward patient capitalists.

Some measures that have been proposed (some of them are already applied in France or the Netherlands) include:

–         Shareholder political rights: limiting access or reduce rights of short-term investors; or increasing those of long-term ones, with multiple voting rights that vest in time, or L-shares, (warrants that vest in time and give the right to purchase at a certain price a certain number of shares).

–         Economic rights: financial rewards to long–term shareholders , (for example additional dividends, or bonus shares).

–         Tax breaks or subsidies, (although those escape from the firm`s control, so the study doesn`t focus on it). Read more…

How are board directors elected? The US/Canada and Spain cases.

October 11, 2013 1 comment

According to the Council of Institutional Investors, (CII), at most US companies, (it is also the case in Canada, although there is a trend to change that), directors are elected by a plurality of votes cast; under this procedure, the candidate that receives the most “for” votes, is elected as a director. This might seem acceptable, but what does this entail? First, a director may be elected by a minority of votes cast, which might put into question the adequacy of the candidate for the job, but this is common to the majority system; second, what happens in an uncontested election? In that case, the election turns into a “for or withhold” choice, so that the “withheld votes” could win if that bipolarity was respected; but, if not, a single “for” vote could be enough for a candidate to be elected. This is the case in Canada and the US, except where companies have adopted an alternative procedure. Majority systems require a candidate to obtain more “for” than “withhold” votes to be elected or reelected, and in many companies, those directors not reaching that target need to offer their resignation, (even if the Board does not accept it, which leads to what recent literature calls “zombie directors”). Read more…

Introducing Growth and Value Creation in a Corporate Governance model

Although early investors and founders in Facebook are necessarily happy with their investment, it is not the case of those investors having joined the company at the occasion of the IPO.

Corporate Governance advocates had somehow predicted the result, as they had argued its governance structure (multiple voting shares allocated to founders and a few others so that they controlled much more than their investment stipulated) did not guarantee shareholder value creation would be a priority. The Corporate Governance model they advocate for focuses in managerial control mechanisms, as the agency problem between investors and stakeholders, versus founders and early investors, needs to be tackled.

Nevertheless, others justify this governance structure: the autocratic system helps founders of high potential growth companies to focus on long-term sustainable growth, while rejecting short-term pressure by equity markets.

Regulation after the late 2000s crisis tried to fight short-termism, introducing shareholder engagement, (thus the two dimension model, managerial control and long-term commitment). But engagement is somehow still limited to voting the shares, and the rational behavior is following proxy advisors, that are not enough to help long-term behavior. Trading differentiated taxes, voting right allocation rules in favor of long-term investors and so on, are nowadays in the political agenda.

But, how can those opposite strengths –short and long-term perspectives- be more efficiently reconciled?

A new Corporate Governance model with a focus on growth and value creation, (the third dimension), is proposed by McCahery, Vermeulen, and Hisatake, in their article “The Present and Future of Corporate Governance: Re-Examining the Role of the Board of Directors and Investor Relations in Listed Companies”.

How does the model work in practice, what is the dynamics?

The point is: shareholder value and stakeholder satisfaction comes from growth and innovation potential, (instead of coming from oversight or long-term investor commitment).

Board dynamics and composition. There are several steps followed by successful companies:

–         First funds come from family, friends, and fools, that do not generally have access to the board.

–         Secondly, angel investors and venture capital funds appear, and they typically have access to the board. They are usually beneficial for growth, for their industry experience, and their strategic involvement, and understanding of value drivers.

–         Third, after an IPO, the model accepts the dual-class share governance structure, as something connected to innovation and value creation in that kind of company, and thinks of the board as not only responsible for oversight functions, but more relevantly for experienced advice for strategy, value creation and growth. That leaves room for boards full of industry experts, familiar to the Ceo or not, but deeply involved in the company`s growth strategy. On the other hand, this model is not confronted to independence, diversity, Chairman-Ceo separation, and other standard composition rules.

The relevance of Investor relations.

The authors advocate for a strong communication and investor relations strategy, so that investors and other stakeholders clearly understand the competitive advantage their corporate governance structure provides, and why it separates from certain general “one-fits-all” recommendations. Investors need to understand how this structure promotes revenue generation and stakeholder satisfaction.

Above all, these companies need to be transparent and engage in information sharing regarding their innovation and growth prospects.